The post of Director of the South African Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) has now been vacant for almost two years after the previous Director resigned under a cloud. That means two Parliaments (the 5th and 6th) have been in violation of their own legislation – the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act (2009, amended 2018).
I worked for two years at the PBO, leading some of its most important projects at the time, and have written at length in the past about its failures (e.g. on nuclear procurement), its importance, why the filling of the Director position is crucial and my own role in trying to remedy the institutional rot/dysfunction. Some of that accountability work is ongoing.
It took over a year for MPs to agree that the post should be advertised and almost a year has elapsed since then before the shortlisted candidates were finally decided on in a meeting on 4 September 2020. While it is possible that the Covid-19 pandemic delayed the process, it was already glacial prior to that and there was little impediment to finalising the list via a virtual meeting of the kind that eventually took place. The previous meeting of the committee took place in December 2019.
Given the broader political dynamics in the country, it seems likely that the delay has been the result of:
- Political lobbying as to who should be deployed to this post (paid at the level of a Director General but with only a small staff complement)
- Lack of prioritisation of the issue given widespread institutional challenges across all three arms of state and the relative disregard of the role of legislatures.
As reflected in the minutes of the Parliamentary Monitoring Group, there are 9 candidates on the shortlist. These include: the current chairperson of the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC), a former CEO and acting chairperson of the FFC, the current acting deputy director general of the Budget Office in the National Treasury, and all three current deputy directors of the PBO. Originally the committee staff had shortlisted 8 candidates but one further candidate (the Treasury official) was added during the meeting. The minutes of the meeting suggest some inconsistency in the application of the experience requirement, with candidates having 10 – 12 years experience being shortlisted and others with more years not being shortlisted. (This may be because of different notions of what constitutes experience for this purpose but it is not clear).
Candidates will need to go through a clearance process by the State Security Agency at the highest clearance category (‘Top Secret’). The discussion in the committee reflected the lack of knowledge of the PBO’s functioning among both the Parliament officials informing the process and MPs themselves. All parties appeared to be of the view that a PBO Director likely would not need to handle classified information. As the first staff member of the PBO to have received classified information through formal channels on behalf of the Office, I can attest to the fact that this is incorrect. What role the SSA should play in relation to this kind of process is of course another matter, since in principle it presents an opportunity for the Executive to interfere in an undesirable fashion (albeit that seems less likely under the current administration).
In principle, candidates should also meet the requirement of being ‘fit and proper persons’. [Declaration: this requirement followed from an amendment to section 15 of the Act which I proposed as part of a public submission in 2018 and was accepted by MPs]. In practice it is unclear at this point how this requirement will be checked. And whether information from the public will be solicited for this purpose. My view is that it should be: if you have any such information on any of the candidates, I suggest sending it to the secretary of the committee.
The nature of PBOs is such that it should be protected from political influence and partisanship of all kinds, not least in the appointment of its staff. Furthermore, whoever is appointed should be able to put whatever personal and institutional views they may hold, or have held, aside and conduct their analysis and research in a competent, fully public interested, non-ideological and non-partisan way. Unfortunately, this seems highly unlikely in the South African case. Instead, what is likely to happen is that the appointed candidate will be the one who is seen as most amenable to whatever the agenda is of the grouping(s) that holds the greatest sway over the appointment.
A faction within the governing ANC along with some opposition MPs and civil society organisations will favour a ‘Treasury-aligned candidate’. (Note: this need not necessarily by a candidate from Treasury, though such candidates may well fit the bill). An alternative faction in the ANC along with other opposition MPs and different civil society groupings may favour a more ‘anti-Treasury’ view. There are 4-5 candidates who, in my view, can be reasonably located in one of these two categories. But one should also not rule out the possibility of an opportunist whose objective is really just to secure the post and sells themselves to one or both parties as necessary. As the reader will see, I am not convinced that any candidate is likely to be appointed who is squarely committed to what the role truly requires.
I will refrain from publicly speculating about how I think the process will, or should, play out in terms of the candidate who is ultimately selected. However, in the past I have indicated that given the historical dysfunction of, and misconduct in, the institution an outside candidate is likely to be preferable. And I continue to hold that view. Parliament partially sabotaged any such candidate by allowing staff renewals and appointments under a brief reappointment by the previous Director, thereby leaving any new Director with some staff who may be a liability. However, a suitably motivated and strategic new Director should be able to improve conduct and culture – as well as remove staff who resist that process.
The PBO is an institution with great potential to serve the public good. One can only hope that the current Parliament makes an appointment that puts it back on the right path, rather than consigning it to further stagnation and membership of a list of institutions with highly paid staff that do little for the public good. It is welcome that much/all of the process will be in the public domain. But as we saw with the appointment of the current Public Protector, transparency of that sort does not mean substantive transparency or guarantee a good outcome.
Note: I did not apply for the position in question and have no material or other interest in the outcome except to the extent that I am invested in the public interest role the PBO is supposed to play.
 For those who don’t know: most legislation is introduced by the Executive and then approved by Parliament, but in special cases Parliament may draft legislation itself – most notably in relation to the conduct of its own affairs. The Money Bills Act is one of the few such pieces of legislation.